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Epilogue to “(De)Memorializing the Korean War: A Critical Intervention” 
 
Bruce Cumings, University of Chicago 
 
 
A curiosity of South Korea’s history is the way in which dictatorships incubate memory. From 
1948 to 1954 the regime of Syngman Rhee was responsible for a minimum of two hundred 
thousand deaths through political murder and massacre, of which roughly thirty thousand were 
killed in the suppression of the Cheju Rebellion. There were many more massacres when the 
Republic of Korea military, the national police, and rampaging right-wing youth groups occupied 
the North in October and November 1950, but we have little evidence of those deaths. Seeking 
any kind of redress for the demise of loved ones—locally, nationally, through the press, or 
through the court system—was impossible as long as Rhee was in power. Trying to do anything 
about these atrocities meant jail, torture, and death. Endless blacklists put the families of victims 
into a kind of living purgatory. When Rhee was finally overthrown in the 1960 April Revolution, 
a brief window of democracy opened and victims and survivors were able, if only for a moment, 
to call attention to what happened, seek redress, build monuments to the dead, or send certain 
perpetrators—like local police—to their own early deaths. Park Chung Hee closed that window 
in May 1961 and immediately set about destroying whatever monuments, petitions, and shouted 
memories might have briefly existed. 
 In this manner, the personal truths of numberless victims and survivors were muted for 
four decades, minus a doomed interruption of a few months. What these survivors knew to be 
true could not be said. It could be remembered, reconnoitered in dreams, visited by ghosts, or 
suppressed in the unconscious, but it could never be spoken of openly. Getting along in South 
Korean society meant saying that a rebellious father, son, daughter, or brother was actually killed 
by Communists. 
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 The kongsandang (Communist party) became the ubiquitous signifier for a bogeyman, a 
Frankenstein, the devil himself. When I taught in a boys’ middle school in 1968 in the aftermath 
of the guerrilla attack on the Blue House and the North Korean seizure of the U.S. spy ship 
Pueblo, the Park regime was engaged in a months-long propaganda campaign described as 
pan’gong p’angch’ŏp—or “anti-Communism, catch spies.” The entire student body would line 
up in their Japanese-bequeathed black uniforms and caps, heads shaved, listening to a supposed 
defector tell them that North Koreans couldn’t even have watches and had only thin rubber shoes 
to wear in the winter. My students would turn in essays about Communists sneaking into their 
homes in the middle of the night to rape and kill their sisters. All this was a by-product of the 
ways in which Japanese colonizers had intimidated and terrorized Koreans with their own fierce 
anti-Communism, rampant for fourteen years after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. 
 When South Korea democratized in the 1990s, suppressed and repressed memories 
finally had an outlet. The truths about the actual perpetrators of mass violence that a few scholars 
had dug out of various foreign archives suddenly seemed scant compared to the welling up of 
personal and popular truths that poured out, often with a thunder of outrage and recrimination. 
But this outpouring was entirely nonviolent, and the Korean Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission provided a sober, careful venue for these truths to see the light of day. Somehow, 
after forty years of silence, Koreans seemed to have intuited that their country had suffered quite 
enough violence. But the memories were alive and burning, and they resulted in dozens of books, 
documentaries, commemorations, and new monuments large and small—a proper requiem for a 
people for whom history, personal truth, and family honor are so important. The assembled 
papers in this special issue detail much of that outpouring, and collectively they make for an 
important leap forward in our understanding of political violence in postwar Korea and the 
intertwining of history and memory. 
 In February 2015 I visited Cheju Island for the first time since 1972. I was with a group 
of scholars that included Kim Seong-nae, who has contributed so brilliantly to enlightening us 
about the memories, dreams, ghosts, and traumas that have inhabited the minds of the survivors 
of the Cheju massacres. I was struck by a sense of time collapsed and refigured: forty-three years 
is a long time to be away, so to speak, but the beautiful island with its black and obsidian 
volcanic rock was not terribly different than when I first saw it, on an ordinary bus circling the 
island. It was less developed than I had feared, and as always, it seems, the weather was perfect. 
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Until the last century most people were lucky to live to be forty-three; a few attained the biblical 
three score and ten. But the memorials we saw and the people we spoke with seemed to have a 
very immediate sense of events that happened almost seventy years ago, to be in close touch with 
a terrible history, and to have achieved a collective victory that would have been unimaginable 
during the long decades of dictatorship. That victory is evident in the expansive Cheju Peace 
Museum, where the names of more than fourteen thousand victims are etched in granite, much 
like at (and showing the immense influence of) Maya Lin’s Vietnam Memorial in Washington, 
DC. 
 Brendan Wright’s excellent article in this issue expresses a different kind of reckoning 
with time. In the 1970s, scholars looking into the Cheju Rebellion had access, for the first time, 
to declassified American documents that were primary evidence of the unrestrained repression 
that Cheju people suffered, and zainichi (ethnic Korean residents of Japan) also had the freedom 
to write books and articles about it. But no South Koreans could speak openly about what had 
happened; to bring attention to these terrible events was to invite a jail term, if not death. Few 
sources existed in Korean, and scholars in the South avoided the subject altogether. Now we 
know in gritty detail what happened in Cheju from 1945 to 1954: we know the names of the 
victims; we can touch those names on granite walls; we can see the leaders of the suppression 
forces on horseback in vintage film from the period. The very recent reckoning with these events 
collapses the four decades of dictatorship into a malevolent but ultimately meaningless black 
hole; what went before and what came after gets brought together with an immediacy that seems 
to erase time, because all of this is new to everyone—including scholars—except for the 
surviving victims themselves. The victims’ truths are now general ones, documented and 
accepted, a true elegy that is all the stronger for being so unexpected. 
 A scholar in an archive has many ways to imagine the events she is plumbing, but there is 
always a nagging sense that one cannot fully know what happened. In this case, what happened 
in Cheju (a massacre of more than three hundred men, women, and children in Punch’ŏn in 
January 1949) is denied there (a few Communists were shot, say the authorities). On whose 
evidence do we place the weight of history? But to have individuals step out of those documents 
and tell their own stories, decades after the fact, is stunning and deeply gratifying to those 
individuals, and to anyone who sincerely cares about their experience. John Merrill was the first 
American scholar to write about these events, and it must be wonderfully rewarding to him that 
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in the Cheju Peace Museum, the first page of his article—“The Cheju Rebellion” (1980)—is 
framed and mounted on a wall. I felt humbled and also proud that the museum displayed a photo 
of me speaking at an event in Osaka commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of 4.3. It is a lucky 
historian indeed who gets this kind of validation, regardless of the many decades separating the 
events, and a triumph for victims finally getting to tell their story. 
 The North Korean memorials and monuments to the Korean War also collapse time, in a 
different way. As Suzy Kim, the guest editor of this special issue of Cross-Currents, writes, to a 
North Korean professor it isn’t a matter of commemorating this war, because the war never 
ended; they are still fighting it, preparing for it to resume, castigating the same enemy with 
which no reconciliation has ever happened—American imperialism. When I was with a Thames 
Television crew in North Korea in 1987, preparatory to the documentary Korea: The Unknown 
War, I was amazed at the immediacy of this war that had occurred nearly forty years earlier. 
When I told one grizzled woman, a former soldier, that American pilots we had interviewed had 
denied that they randomly shot peasants in the fields, she exploded: “That’s a complete lie! I saw 
them do it with my own eyes.” My two guides told me how their immediate family members had 
been lost to the saturation bombing. So there they are, remembering everything and forgetting 
nothing; and here we are, in the land of “the forgotten war,” where well-informed people can 
barely get two sentences out about the Korean War without misconstruing its truths. In this way, 
Americans erase time, memory—and responsibility. 
 Seunghei Clara Hong writes of “the ironic and troublesome effect of positioning the 
United States as the authority of truth” about what happened at just one site of massacre and 
memory, Nogŭnri. Hong’s article reminded me of the evening I stayed up late to watch a 
Pentagon spokesman present and disseminate the final American report on this massacre, which 
concluded that it was an unfortunate episode in the fog of war, but that there was no evidence of 
direct American orders to fire on civilians. This was an appalling denouement to the one instance 
of massacre during the Korean War that ever got serious press attention in the United States 
(when the Associated Press first broke the story in 1999, the New York Times put it on the front 
page). Many years earlier I had found in declassified U.S. records direct orders to fire on 
civilians around the same time, but the hair the Pentagon split was to say they couldn’t find such 
records for this particular incident—even though Nogŭnri was just one of many instances of 
American soldiers firing on civilians. A late-night news conference took place at the Pentagon 
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with a handful of reporters and a hefty, balding spokesman, who seemed almost to gloat at 
releasing the “news” that, when all was said and done, nothing serious had happened in this 
remote village—just some American soldiers violating orders (like at My Lai in Vietnam). 
 Sunghoon Han’s essay reminded me of the day in 1987 when I interviewed Kim Myong 
Ja, one of the only survivors of the Sinch’ŏn Massacre, at the site of the crime. She was wearing 
a silk hanbok, her hair nicely coiffed, and she struck me as the solid, reliable mother of four that 
she said she was, now working in the Revolutionary History Research Center. She had the polite, 
firm manner and nurturing self-confidence that is so charming in middle-aged Korean women, 
and before the interview commenced she was happy to answer my questions about her life and 
family, which I held to a minimum. (She didn’t send many in my direction, which was fine with 
me since I hoped she thought I was an Englishman.)1 Mrs. Kim said she was nine years old at the 
time of the atrocity, and that her father, an official in the local People’s Committee, had been 
imprisoned shortly after the area was occupied by American and South Korean forces. Her 
parents and most of her six brothers and sisters died in the war. She attended one of the many 
schools set up for orphans, eventually graduating from college. 
 At the time of my interview with Mrs. Kim, the massacre site basically consisted of two 
big tombs, round and grass-covered—one for mothers and one for children—plus an empty 
concrete storehouse and a tunnel. We observed a weathered picture of Mrs. Kim as a schoolgirl, 
her face round and her hair tied neatly in two pigtails. The storehouse and tunnel became the 
charnel houses into which some four hundred women and children were herded in November 
1950 and kept without food and water for days, while they were prevailed on to reveal the 
location of their husbands and older sons. According to Mrs. Kim, when the women begged for 
water for the children, a big American threw buckets of shit on them. After a few days they were 
doused with gasoline and burned to death, save Kim Myong Ja and a couple of other kids, who 
found themselves at the top of the heap, near a ventilation hole, when it was all over. 
 Our Thames Television crew asked some of the locals at this museum who the 
perpetrators were, and they uniformly attributed the massacre to an American officer named 
Harrison. When I asked his first name, they said “Dumaiden,” or something that sounded like 
that in Korean rendering; none of them spoke English, and the event occurred in the vast havoc 
and chaos of successive, back-and-forth military occupation of the area by all sides. Certainly, 
Americans were in command of all armed forces in the North, but Hwang Sŏk-yŏng in his novel 
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The Guest says the atrocity took place at the hands of Christians who had fled to the South before 
the war, as part of widespread killings by both them and their Communist antagonists. 
 There is no question that an atrocity occurred that day in Sinch’on, because we were later 
able to compare our visit against newsreel footage taken when the bodies were discovered, and 
that footage could not have been faked. (Thames Television experts painstakingly counted and 
measured the bricks in the charnel house wall to verify the authenticity of the footage.) At the 
time, we could verify nothing, however, about the footage’s authorship. 
 Journalist Eli Schmetzer of the Chicago Tribune would dismiss what happened there. He 
also visited Sinch’ŏn, misspelling it as “Chichon,” and titled his account “North Korean Museum 
Stokes Loathing of U.S.” He quoted an unnamed Eastern European: “Chichon stinks. It smells of 
fraud.” Schmetzer went on to say that “each year 300,000 North Koreans are brainwashed at 
Chichon.” All of this is part of the “twisted version of history that North Korea has dished up,” 
warning people that unless they’re loyal to Kim Il Sung, “the bogeyman GIs will come back to 
rape, torture and burn everyone alive.”2 I have never understood how foreigners can spend a few 
days in divided Korea and pay so little attention to its tragic history, but always come down on 
the side of truth and right: the North Koreans are to blame. 
 Recently, I had the opportunity to discuss the liberation period and the Korean War with 
a PBS team that hopes to produce a documentary on this war. When I mentioned the Korean 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission and its painstaking work in documenting the myriad of 
massacres that occurred, they asked me, “What about North Korea? What about their massacres? 
Doesn’t this end up making the North look better than the South?” The implication was that 
political massacres, like everything else about the two Koreas, had to be molded in the vice of 
national division—and that if the North didn’t come off worse, as it always does in the American 
media, trouble might lie ahead. I said that the North did not have the imprimatur of the United 
Nations, or cardinal membership in the “free world,” or the continuous support of the United 
States. Someday, what the North has done will see the light of day, and then we can examine its 
record. Until then, one should not feel responsible for North Korean behavior, which is almost 
universally taken to be the worst in the world (whether true or not). Whatever blood is on North 
Korea’s hands is just that, on its hands. But as Americans we bear a deep responsibility for 
bringing into being and then supporting to the hilt a murderous regime. The easiest thing in the 
world is to denounce this or that North Korean crime. What is hard is to scrupulously examine a 
Cumings   240 
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 14 (March 2015) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-14) 
 
sordid history, with clear eyes and sincerity. In that way, the scholars in this special issue finally 
pay the occluded memories of thousands of victims and survivors what is simply their due. 
 
Bruce Cumings is Gustavus F. and Ann M. Swift Distinguished Service Professor in History and 
the College at the University of Chicago. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Notes 
 
1 For a longer account of our visit to Sinch’ŏn, see Cumings (1993). 
2 Eli Schmetzer, “North Korean Museum Stokes Loathing of U.S.,” Chicago Tribune, 
August 31, 1989. 
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